Introduction
In many OECD countries the effective retirement age is well below the statutory retirement age. The major reason for the low labor-force participation of the 55 to 64 age group are high net withdrawal rates, i.e. a major reduction in employment figures of workers when moving to the next higher age group. At the same time, many governments consider extending working life as the dominant strategy for keeping social security sustainable, 1 while keeping the standard of living (almost) constant because individuals continue to earn an income. This argument, however, depends strongly on the supply of and the demand for older workers. It implicitly presumes that workers remain employable until the new, higher retirement age.
However, if the effective, or rather economic, retirement age does not increase when the statutory retirement age is raised, old-age poverty of large groups in society could be the result.
For instance, Butrica et al. (2002) show that raising the statutory retirement age will contribute strongly to the projected rise in old-age poverty in the US. 2 Likewise, extended periods of unemployment are seen as a major explanation for old-age poverty (see, e.g., Smeeding, 1999 Smeeding, , 2001 Gottschalk, 2006; or Favreault and Steuerle, 2008 ).
In the context of pension reform, increasing the employability of the older people is therefore highly important. As Holzmann (2005) argues, the employability of older workers calls for changes in the wage profile and for measures to maintain and raise their productivity, especially the implementation of lifelong learning. In today's fast-changing knowledge economy people need to upgrade their skills -in both the personal and professional domain -throughout their adult lives to cope with 1 See, e.g., Barr (2004, p. 209) or Cremer and Pestieau (2003) who even expect a "double dividend" from raising the statutory retirement age. Based on a OLG-CGE model, Marchiori (2008) explicitly calls for raising the retirement age for unskilled in Europe as the most effective measure for relieving fiscal pressure. 2 Considering above-NAIRU economies, Michello and Ford (2006) argue that increasing retirement age will directly add to unemployment.
modern life (OECD, 2007) . Only this guarantees that they will reamain employable for the duration of their working life and beyond. In fact, several studies observe a growing importance of certain general and cognitive skills in the labor market. 3 Not surprisingly, lifelong learning for all has become a widely shared policy objective among industrialized countries; a striking example being the European Union (starting with the Lisbon Strategy) which concluded that a "need for a continuous renewal of citizens' knowledge, skills and competences is crucial for the EU's competitiveness and social cohesion" (EU Commission, 2006) . Whether investing into general education or lifelong learning, respectively, will indeed help to synchronize the economic and the statutory retirement age will be a central focus of our model.
There is no doubt that pension systems' fiscal impact plays an important role in keeping labor-force participation of the older workers low, for example by earlyretirement schemes (see, e.g., Gruber and Wise, 1999; or Fenge and Pestieau, 2006 ).
However, according to Duval (2003) only about one third of the decline in the older males' labor-force participation rate can be attributed to implicit tax rates and the retirement age. 4 The rest stems from demand-side factors or preferences for leisure.
It is often claimed that the majority of older workers cannot choose to work to age 67 or beyond as there is insufficient demand for this type of labor. Standard arguments are costly seniority rules (Lazear 1979 (Lazear , 1981 or youth unemployment, which is hoped to be overcome by pushing older workers out of work (see the discussion in Boldrin et al., 1999) . Fenge and Pestieau (2006, p. 107 ) point out four potential explanations for this effect:
• Low-skilled older workers may exhibit declining relative productivity in times of rapid technological change.
• Insufficient training may contribute to declining productivity among older workers. 3 See, e.g., Gould (2002) , Weinberg (2000) , Murname et al. (1995) or Taber (2001) . Bishop (1991) , however, found mixed results on this issue. 4 Johnson's (2000) estimate of this measure is even lower at 11 per cent.
• Temporary negative demand shocks may lead to an irreversible labor force withdrawal.
• Rigid age-earnings profiles caused by specific institutional arrangements (e.g. employment-protection legislation) reduce employment opportunities for the older unemployed.
In this paper we focus on the first three propositions. Over the past thirty years, in almost all industrialized countries demand for labor has shifted in favor of skilled workers. There is substantial evidence that skill-biased technological progress and the globalization of production are among the main driving forces of this shift in demand. 5 As a response and in line with the OECD Jobs Strategy (OECD, 1994), many industrialized countries have responded by taking measures to improve the education of the workforce. 6 Since older workers are particularly affected by technologically induced skill depreciation, 7 adult training and lifelong learning are an essential part of these programs. As the OECD (2004) finds, "for older and low-educated workers, training allows attaining and maintaining the competences required to bring productivity in line with market wages, thereby sustaining employment prospects of these groups" (OECD, 2004, p. 185) . From a theoretical perspective, standard arguments are that these competences should be sufficiently general to facilitate adjustment to technological change (Welch, 1970) and/or to future shocks as only this reduces uncertainty such that lower human-capital investment is avoided (Levhari and Weiss, 1974).
Despite the efforts taken, the empirical evidence on returns to training and adult learning is still puzzling (OECD, 2004 This explains, among other things, the strong involvement of most governments and some international organizations in lifelong learning activities.
Taking these stylized facts from the labor market as a point of departure we focus on the production process, and hence analyze the demand side of the labor market in a rigorous way. We obtain conditions for the employability of older workers or even more generally, an aging workforce. The most important forces for changes in production processes and hence labor demand are technical progress and shifts in international markets. Therefore, both effects on the labor demand for older workers will be studied.
In our approach the population is heterogeneous. The analysis will confirm some intuitively expected phenomena. For instance, endogenously depreciating human capital leads to an economic retirement age which is not necessarily in line with the statutory retirement age; or, in addition increasing technical progress will speed up the depreciation process of a certain human capital.
However, some results and implications of the analysis are intuitively less obvious and go beyond the standard debate surrounding this issue.
Even fully flexible wages will not be able to generate market equilibrium in the labor market segment of older workers. While labor with flexible technological competencies is able to switch to any technology efficiently, labor using vintagespecific skills is discarded no matter which wage they would agree to work for.
Lowering wages is not a feasible way to increase the retirement age of workers with depreciated skills. Policies driving the economy towards full employment (for the market segment of older workers) can be inefficient. Unemployment may be an efficient second best policy.
Furthermore, changes in international markets have considerable effects on the employability of older workers. Often globalization and international outsourcing of certain production processes are regarded as a cause of non-employability of older workers with lower skills. Therefore we include outsourcing (as import of intermediate goods) in our analysis and show that employability depends on the development of the terms of trade. Improving terms of trade will increase the duration of employability of a vintage of workers with inflexible (vintage specific) skills.
While technological progress and global conditions are most important for the humancapital depreciation process, they are most difficult to influence. Therefore -as argued before -education is frequently regarded as a solution to this depreciation problem. Improving initial education and lifelong learning is often suggested to increase the productivity of aging labor and thus to keep labor employed until the statutory retirement age is reached. However, while this appears plausible at a first glance, it is not the outcome of our theoretical analysis. According to our model, which analyses the effects of education policy with respect to the human capital depreciation process, we obtain:
• An improvement of initial schooling, that is, education before working life starts, will affect income levels and the distribution of income. However, spending on initial education has no effect on the time path of human capital depreciation and the economic retirement age of the technologically bound and hence less flexible workforce.
• Lifelong learning does not solve the problem of synchronizing economic and statutory retirement age either. From our model we learn that lifelong learning helps to increase the individual probability of finding a job when people grow older and hence reduces the unemployment rate of an aging generation.
However, lifelong learning cannot adjust the speed of the depreciation process.
As long as lifelong learning does not turn all workers into fully flexible labor the problem remains. Education policy has a limited effect and the problem remains unsolved. 10 The internal depreciation of human capital -the loss of physical abilities and mental capacities -is not considered in the model, but could easily be added. The consideration of internal human capital depreciation would lead to decreasing learning profiles, but would not raise the rate of withdrawal from the active labor force.
retire. The effective retirement age is endogenously determined as the point in time when the productive value of vintage specific human capital approaches zero. As we mentioned before, this process is decisively encouraged by certain elements of the social security system such as early retirement plans. Thus, the model is a combination of the putty-putty approach first modeled by Solow (1960) and the putty-clay approach first modeled by Johansen (1959) and Salter (1960) .
11
The production ex ante and ex post is modeled by a nested CES function. Aggregate output, Y , is the sum of vintage outputs, Y V , producing: 
The already installed production process is more difficult to adjust. Ex post the inputs cannot be substituted to the same extent as ex ante. Thus, the elasticity of 11 Putty-putty models with limited substitution possibilities ex post can be found in Scheper (1968), , and Meijers and Zon (1994) . 12 We denote all variables belonging to a certain vintage with a subindex V .
The following two conditions ensure that the relation of the factor productivities does not change for the technology after it has been installed:
Formally, a continuous differentiable relation between the ex post and the ex ante production function is guaranteed. γ υ and δ υ are determined depending on the parameters γ and 1 − γ.
Schooling system: To determine domestic labor services, we need to characterize the workforce. As the structure of human capital is endogenous, and the agents of the domestic labor force are heterogeneous in terms of learning abilities, the education system plays a crucial role. We distinguish between two types of education:
first, initial schooling and second, supplementary lifelong learning.
Initial schooling equips workers with vintage-specific skills that enable them to use the most modern technology available at the time a new generation of workers enters the market. These skills lead to the vintage-specific human capital endowment of the workers.
With lifelong learning workers are enabled to switch to new technologies. In this model lifelong learning is a resource-absorbing schooling process. Successful attendance will lead to technological flexibility. By this definition an established systematic lifelong learning system helps to adjust aging labor to a changing environment.
However, the suggested ideas imply that on the one hand workers successfully attending a lifelong learning system obtain sufficient flexible technological skills, and hence could work until the end of their life. Further, while in this model spending on initial schooling leads to identical abilities for all participants, lifelong learning is not equally successful for all attending labor.
The different effects of lifelong learning on different agents of the heterogeneous labor force separates workers with only vintage-specific skills from workers with flexible technological competencies. Therefore, spending on different forms of education determines the skill and competence structure of the labor force. If the investment in lifelong learning increases, the share of workers with flexible technological abilities increases relatively.
As described, the schooling process in this model is a sequence of two education cycles. Initial schooling is followed by lifelong learning. Starting with initial schooling the endowment of a vintage workforce N s V is determined by the rate of income spent on initial schooling τ 1 . Assuming a minimum required level τ min 1 , initial schooling is spread equally over the whole workforce. The vintage-specific human capital endowment of workers entering the labor market is
While initial schooling is equally successful for all workers, lifelong learning is more complex. Although all workers undergo both types of education, the success of lifelong learning depends on the distribution of the population's learning capabilities, because we consider heterogeneous agents.
As q stands for the probability that lifelong learning is successful, q describes the effectiveness of this education instrument. Even more, we assume that q depends on the resources spent on lifelong learning (R II = τ 2 Y ) and the distribution of the population's learning capabilities:
Therefore, the more resources spent on lifelong learning each year, the more likely a technological flexibility will be built up (
Further, heterogeneous abilities of the workforce cause the marginal effectiveness of additional spending to decrease.
Thus, even if we assume that all workers attend an organized process of lifelong learning the increase in the probability of success of lifelong learning decreases with an increasing level of R II (
Hence, the aggregate effect of lifelong learning can be summarized as follows: The education system leads to a Bernoulli distribution of workers. Attending lifelong learning enables part of each population vintage to switch to any other technology.
This group can be referred to as flexible labor. The vintage-specific skill of inflexible labor is called (vintage-specific) human capital h V (t, t) and thus this human capital is connected to the vintage-specific technology throughout its entire economic life. We will skip the E henceforth, as we are interested only in the expected value. 13 Since it is more realistic that even flexible labor needs some resources for upgrading skills, R II could also include upgrading costs of any flexible labor to any other technology. In this interpretation of R II the model would include more than an initial education system. R II would be part of a life long learning education system. However, in order to keep the focus clear, we will not go into further detail at this point.
Labor market: Let us now take a closer look at the labor market. If workers have flexible abilities, they can switch to any technology efficiently. Thus, technological progress, λ V , augments this type of labor. At time t labor with flexible competencies demanded by the technology installed in v in efficiency units is
Since technological progress λ V depends on the time of installation, technological progress augments only new technologies, not already installed ones. Furthermore, we assume that technological progress grows at the exponential rateλ :=λ
14 Flexible labor is demanded by the newest m(t) technologies. Denoting T as the total lifetime, labor is supplied for the newest T vintages. Thus, aggregate demand and aggregate supply of flexible labor is
As we assume perfectly competitive markets, workers descending from T vintages will be in demand due to the newest m technologies. Thus, these workers will never be unemployed. Their retirement usually begins at the statutory retirement age, which is here equivalent to T . The remaining N s V,I workers entering the labor market use their vintage-specific human capital accumulated during initial schooling. They continue using the same technology throughout their worklife, since lifelong learning was not successful and they do not have the ability to switch to newer technologies. The human capital level of a vintage is the human capital endowment multiplied by the number of workers using vintage-specific skills: Obviously, this labor is fully employed if T 5 m(t). In terms of retirement, this implies that the worker retires at the statutory retirement age.
Labor services: Having characterized the labor market, labor services can now be determined. Here again the putty-putty technology with its different elasticities of substitution ex ante and ex post has to be considered. Installing a new technology, the labor inputs vintage-specific human capital H V and flexible labor in efficiency units Λ V can easily be substituted. The ex ante production of labor services is assumed to be of Cobb-Douglas type:
Thus, the elasticity of substitution is σ 3 = 1. It is also possible to substitute the inputs ex post. However, the elasticity of substitution ex post is assumed to be smaller than ex ante: σ 4 := 1 1+ρ 4 < σ 3 = 1. For the labor services we obtain
for υ < t. The following two conditions guarantee that the relation of productivities does not change when moving from ex ante to ex post service production:
Thus, α υ and β υ are determined endogenously.
Efficient factor allocation: With a putty-putty technology the efficient allocation of inputs can be divided into two parts: (i) The optimal human capital and the optimal import intensity are chosen by maximizing the profits of employing vintagespecific human capital when installing a new technology.
(ii) Since the production factors can be substituted ex post, the relation of the inputs is chosen optimally after installing a technology.
(i) Let p be the price of imports. Adopting the small country assumption p is regarded as exogenous. The profits of employing vintage-specific human capital are
where r is the quasi-rent of vintage-specific human capital and w the wage rate of flexible labor. Writing this equation in intensity form we get (π :=
):
The optimal vintage-specific human capital intensity at the time of installation is ∂π ∂κ(t, t) = 0 ⇐⇒
and the optimal import intensity is
(ii) Having installed a technology the inputs are then inserted efficiently by maximizing the profits of a certain technology (v= installing time, t= present time)
r V is the vintage rental rate of vintage-specific human capital determining the wage of inflexible labor. Since human capital is tied to a certain vintage and no internal depreciation of human capital is considered, we have
In contrast flexible labor and imports inserted in a certain technology can change after installing a technology. Thus, the following two profit maximization conditions follow. Imports are allocated efficiently ex post such that for v < t we obtain
Workers with flexible technological skills are also allocated efficiently ex post:
The rental rate of vintage-specific human capital is determined by the zero-profit condition:
Using Euler's theorem (15) can be written as
The scrapping rule is straightforward. A vintage is discarded after m vintages if the profits of the vintage vanishes (see Benhabib and Rustichini, 1993 , and van Hilten, 1991, for scrapping rules) i.e. the income of vintage-specific human capital is zero,
This scrapping rule determines the economic scrapping time m of a technology vintage.
Solution of the Model
We solve the model for steady-state. 16 To show the effects of the putty-putty technology, we focus on the development of the variables of one vintage. Equations 15 For v = t this condition is equivalent to equation (12) -see Corollary 5. 16 In order to allow readers to follow our argument more easily, the derivation of all relevant theorems and lemmas is delegated to the appendix.
(1)- (16) 
Second, to obtain the remaining variables the human capital intensity and the quasirent have to be determined. Depending on κ the growth path of the variables follows immediately. 23 Human capital intensity and the quasi-rent of vintage-specific human capital are determined through the supply and demand for vintage-specific human capital given in equations (6) flexible labor is positive. 25 The economic worklife of flexible workers has not yet ended -they may continue to work until the statutory retirement age.
Instead of characterizing the demand for flexible labor, the development of human capital intensity of a vintage κ(v, t) =
can be considered. As plotted in figure 1 (b) the intensity increases as the technology becomes older. therefore, productivity y V (v, t) =
rises. Further, it follows that the vintage output Y V (v, t) reduces as the vintage becomes older as plotted in figure 2 (b).
As shown in Lemma 2, y V (v, t) and s(v, t) as well as y V (v, t) and im(v, t) develop proportionally in steady-state. Thus, the statements about the vintage output can be transferred to these variables.
To address economic intuition the model can be characterized by two features. First, the technology is putty-putty with different elasticities of substitution ex ante and ex post. The factors of production can be easily substituted when a new technology is installed and the substitutability of installed technologies is smaller. Second, the factors of production are imports and domestic labor services. For the heterogeneous agents the education system -consisting of initial schooling and lifelong learning -leads to a binomial distribution of the workforce into labor using vintage-specific skills (inflexible labor) and technologically flexible labor. Flexible labor can be employed in any technology and will never be unemployed. Labor using vintagespecific skills is tied to a specific technology. The rental rate of vintage-specific human capital of a vintage is r V (v, t). The older the technology, the lower the rental rate of vintage-specific human capital ( ∂r V (v,t) ∂t < 0). Thus, the income of workers using vintage-specific skills decreases as workers become older. A technology vintage is scrapped when the income of these workers is zero (r V (v, v + m) = 0, see figure   3 ). Full depreciation of a human capital vintage and hence a rental rate of vintagespecific skills of zero determines the economic retirement age of a vintage of this sort of labor. The retirement age is an endogenously determined variable regardless of whether statutory retirement age has been reached. Workers remain unemployed until they become eligible for pension benefits.
Economic and Statutory Retirement Age:
The first fundamental result of the model is a distinction between the statutory and the economic retirement age. Unlike the statutory retirement age the effective economic retirement age is endogenous and not under direct political control. A politically determined increase in the statutory retirement age T can only be a successful strategy as long as the statutory retirement The implication of this finding is fundamental. Full depreciation of vintage specific human capital means that even for a zero wage these workers are not employable.
As there is no demand for such workers -no matter what the price -there is no instantaneous mechanism that could lead to labor market equilibrium. The reason for this market failure is a rigidity generated by the vintage structure of the technology, which hence lies in the past of the appearance of this market problem. Further, despite additional lifelong learning this group also had, these workers could not become technologically flexible, and hence they could not switch to an employable technology. 27 Clearly the model has no market segment for no skills and in the real world this market segment still exists. However, an inflow of complete vintages of workerseven if they are older -will drive down wages in this "no-skill-segment" so close to zero that a large fraction of these vintages can be expected to be absorbed by the social security system. Therefore, we do not believe that the no-skills segment can 27 The idea of retraining and upgrading of vintage-specific skills will be discussed later.
solve the problem. Of course, several questions remain. It has to be noted that workers using vintagespecific skills have no chance of being re-employed without reinvesting in human capital. As discussed above, decreasing wages is ineffective in reducing or even avoiding unemployment. The rate of technological change would have to be decreased. However, slowing down technical progress cannot be a good policy choice to improve the health of the pension system. For many governments this is a dilemma which they attempt to solve by retaining (possibly inefficient) early retirement rules, despite increasing retirement age. If these rules could be targeted only at workers with the oldest vintage-specific skills, in fact the double dividend may be reaped. However, most early retirement schemes have far too broad a scope.
International Integration, Outsourcing and Endogenous Retirement: In this model increasing global competition leads to a reduction in the relative price of imports p.
Due to the small country assumption the price of imports is an exogenous variable.
Improving terms of trade (dp < 0) affects the scrapping time:
If the price of imports decreases, the demand for intermediary imports, i.e. the level of outsourcing of domestic production in favor of international imported intermediary goods, will increase. Since intermediary imports can be substituted by domestic labor services, the demand for domestic resources decreases in all vintages. Thus, the demand for flexible labor combined with new technologies decreases in each vintage. Because a technology vintage is discarded, when flexible labor is demanded by the newest m * technologies, more vintages can now be combined with flexible labor such that the scrapping time increases.
This mechanism suggests that increasing international integration -with decreasing import prices for most of the advanced economies -is not the reason for rising net withdrawal rates of older workers in OECD countries. Instead, according to the model international specialization and outsourcing can help to slow down the speed of human capital depreciation. Therefore, under the conditions outlined, international integration will help to align the economic retirement age with the politically desired increasing statutory retirement age. A rise in the statutory retirement age can c.p. be introduced more easily.
Education Policy
Up to this point we discussed how different factors determine the endogenous retirement age from the perspective of the demand side of the labor market. A complex interaction of input factors and vintage technology determines the demand structure for different qualifications and hence the scrapping time of vintage-specific human capital.
However, in addition to the structure of labor demand the structure of labor supply is also relevant. For a given vintage of people a two-stage education process generates a certain structure of skills and competencies during their working lifes. For this supply structure of labor not all labor may be employable until the statutory retirement age (the conditions are discussed above). Therefore, the first question to answer is if and how education policy can solve the problem of a (too) rapid endogenous depreciation of inflexible human capital. What sort of schooling and education process is able to align the economic retirement age with the politically determined statutory retirement age? In other words, how can we adjust the time of full depreciation of human capital vintages to fit the politically desired age? In order to answer this question we first need to find out how increasing education efforts within the introduced two-stage system of education may affect the economic retirement age.
Increasing Efforts in Initial Schooling: The described problem is caused by the depreciation process of vintage-specific human capital. Skills learned during initial schooling are fully depreciated. Therefore we could follow the idea of improving initial schooling and hence the productivity of vintage-specific skills to enlarge the duration of employability of these skills. In the model this policy would be an increase in the fraction of GDP τ 1 spend on initial schooling.
However, looking at the model's results we can see that raising the fraction spend on initial schooling does not affect the scrapping time of this sort of human capital and hence does not help to aling the retirement age with the statutory level:
An improvement in initial schooling is futile for reducing the rate of withdrawal from the labor market of older workers. While resources spent on initial schooling affect the level of a number of different variables (especially the wage of inflexible workers), they do not affect the structure of growth rates that determine the scrapping time.
A technology is discarded after m * vintages if the costs of imports and flexible labor equal the vintage output, i.e. if
holds. Since imports are demanded proportionally to the vintage output -im(v, t) = cy V (v, t) with c = const.-and the wage rate of flexible labor is proportional to the vintage output -w(t) = αy V (t, t) -the output level is not affected by the scrapping time.
What are the effects of rising expenditure on initial schooling? Raising τ 1 leads to an increasing supply of vintage-specific human capital such that human capital intensity increases as the price of vintage-specific human capital, the quasi-rent of each unit human capital, decreases. There are two effects. First, even though the scrapping time is not affected, workers with vintage-specific skills achieve higher earnings for the time they are employed. Due to better education the rental income curve of a worker's vintage-specific human capital r V (v, t)h V (see figure 3 ) moves 31 See Corollary 7.
upward. Second, the vintage output and thus the aggregate output increases. Higher earnings and higher aggregate output may therefore help to improve the financial health of the pension system. However, this is a secondary effect. Higher spending on initial schooling is not a feasible policy option for decreasing the unemployment rate among older workers or adjusting the economic retirement age. 
Increasing Efforts in
Once again, the structure of the growth rates in steady-state is not affected. However, it is important to note that this result depends on the substitutability of labor services in the production process (7) . If the production technology is Cobb-Douglas, increasing endowment of any human capital is neutral. However, if the different labor services in (7) are complements, there may be effects for the scrapping time. 
32 See Corollary 7. 33 However, if the different labor services in (7) are complements, there may be effects on the scrapping time as well because an increasing productivity of the skilled would only partially be offset by an increase in wages. Thus, the employment of additional workers with inflexible skills would be possible and, as a result, the scrapping time of technology vintages would increase.
Therefore, the problem is not solved, but it becomes less serious on aggregate. Investments in lifelong learning, providing flexible skills, should therefore complement the introduction of a higher statutory retirement age.
However, proposing additional marginal investments for a skill upgrade by lifelong learning addresses not only the technological conditions. Remember, the fraction of labor considered is the group where lifelong learning did not work so far. By definition, we do not look at the people who are able to adjust at low or no cost to the new technology. Therefore, it can be expected that learning capabilities are at the lower end of the society's capability distribution and hence limited. Hence the costs of upgrading skills can be regarded as significantly higher if more people are involved. For this group the problem of high training costs for a small skill improvement becomes even more obvious when people get older. As a result the investment in lifelong learning may not pay off and unemployment may be a efficient second best solution.
Conclusion
Due to the high net withdrawal rates among older workers as well as the aging of societies, pension system reforms have become a central issue on the political agenda in most industrialized countries. A widely discussed reform proposition is to extend working life by increasing the statutory retirement age of workers. This proposition is implicitly based on the assumption that retirement age is fully under political control. Contrary to this proposition, the analysis in this paper suggests that the retirement age has to be considered endogenous due to the depreciation of vintage- With a putty-putty vintage model we focus on the production process, and hence analyze the demand side of the labor market in a rigorous way. We obtain conditions for the employability of older workers or even more generally, an aging workforce.
The analysis confirms some intuitively expected phenomena. For instance, endogenously depreciating human capital leads to an economic retirement age which is not necessarily in line with the statutory retirement age; or, increasing technical progress will speed up the depreciation process of certain human capital. Moreover, some results are beyond the standard debate. First, even fully flexible wages will not be able to generate market equilibrium in the labor market segment of older workers. Second, changes in international markets have considerable effects on the employability of older workers. Improving terms of trade will increase the duration of employability of a vintage of workers with inflexible (vintage specific) skills.
Often education is regarded as the cure to solve the problem of early human capital depreciation. However, the analysis suggests that the effects of education and even of lifelong learning are limited with respect to the duration of employability. More specifically, an improvement in initial schooling, i.e. education before working life starts, will affect income levels and the distribution of income. However, spending on initial education has no effect on the time path of human capital depreciation and the economic retirement age. Even lifelong learning does not solve the problem of synchronizing the economic and the statutory retirement age. From our model we learn that lifelong learning helps to increase the individual probability of finding a job when people grow older and hence reduces the unemployment rate of an aging generation. However, lifelong learning will not affect the speed of the depreciation process.
Appendix:
Proof: Equation (4) is equivalent to
It follows directlyδ t = 0. Using condition (5) leads to
and it followsγ t = 0. Equation (4) can be transformed to
The last equation impliesα t = 0. Using condition (10) leads to
and it followsβ t = 0. 
As for an installed technology equation (13) 
It follows
There is a linear relation between im(t, t) and s(t, t):
The first statement of the lemma will follow, if this result is inserted in the production function:
The second part of the proof is organized in the same way. It is
It follows
As above we get for im(v, t) and s(v, t):
Inserting this result into the production function (3), it follows the second statement:
Observe that c 2 is constant, because γ v and δ v are constant due to Lemma 1.
Corollary 3
For the wage rate of flexible labor the following condition holds: w(t) = αy V (t, t)
Proof: Using Lemma 2 we get the wage when writing equation (14) for v = t:
= αy V (t, t).
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Corollary 4 For the output in intensity form we get
and therefore .
Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning
The growth rate of y V (v, t) follow fromŵ =λ V =λ andα = 0. The statement for the imports follows from Lemma 2, since im(v, t) = c 3 y V (v, t) with c 3 = γv p 1 1+ρ 2 holds. 2 Corollary 5 Equation (13) for v = t is equivalent to equation (12), i.e. it is ∂y V (t,t) ∂im(t,t) = p.
Proof: The statement follows directly, if y V (t, v) = y V (t, t)e Proof: A vintage is discarded, if returns of the vintage-specific human capital are zero:
y V (t − m * , t) − im(t − m * , t) = w(t).
In Lemma 4 it is proved that y V (t − m, t) = y V (t, t)e 
